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In recent years there has been a substantial increase in regulatory
attention in the area of rotor fragment protection. Concern appears to
stem primarily from an apparent nearly constant per year occurrence of
r
incidents involving uncontained fragments, large fan blade masses of the
large high bypass ratio turbofans, and degree of secondary damage produced
in some instances. Increase emphasi[ is evident from NASA and FAA activities
including their sponsorship of some industry activities.
It is essential that the containment question be examined in the correct
perspective. The commercial record is a fairly convincing argument that
the requirements and practices in place today are reasonably effective.
Since Douglas' entry into the jet transport field in 1956, two hulls have
been lost and a single fatality incurred in a third incident involving
rotor/blade failures. In none would additional "armor" isolation, or
redundancy have affected the outcome. However, this is not to imply that
there is no room for improvement. Some ideas that may provide insight
include review of key controlling requirements, armor as a brute force
approach, and an integrated airframe and engine solution.
As part of the approach to rotor/blade fragment protection, key airworthi-
ness design criteria considerations for fragment protection are reviewed.
Various FAA requirements in FAR Parts 25 and 33, plus interpretive 8110
orders, deal with engine and installation requirements specifically aimed
at minimizi,_g this type of hazard. These requirements cover such features
and design areas as engine isolation, containment of damage from rotor blade
failures, containment of fire, and design of other features of the aircraft
to permit continued flight and safe landing in the event of more serious
engine failures.
Armor represents one end of the spectrum of protection approaches. An FAA
sponsored study is in process at Douglas to evaluate the impact of provid-
: ing aircraft armor in lieu of engine armor for typical 3 and 4 engine wide
bodied transports. The initial area of discussion deals with protection
within the length of the engine case. Protection from fragments exiting
' / ahead of the engine inlet flange has some unique considerations and is
therefore treated separately.
' For protection within the length of the engine case, armor weight penalties,
plus fuel burned and dollar cost c_ carrying the armor protection are defined.
Immediately ahead of the inlet flange, direct tangential impacts are pre-
dominant, but further forward, rebound impacts predominate. Armor thickness
_ requirements and fuel cost impact of protection are shown.
The right answer is a balanced or "system" approach involving both the air-
craft and engine design. This approach whether formalized or not is basically
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responsible for the demonstrated success to date. Accomplishment involves
nothing more than the systematic recognition of the problem during the basic
design and development of both the aircraft and engine. Key steps in the
aircraft design are delineated.
Design considerations relative to a tail engine installation are delineated.
Limited armor is used for specific applications, i.e., tail engine fuel line
, protection, and tail engine inlet "flack jacket".
Results of demonstration testing and weight penalties are reviewed and areas
of engine design which might be examined for optimum overall solutions are
suggested.
This paper attempts to place the contaim_ent issue in better perspective
and is felt to show that we are not faced with problems which would justify
major regulatory and/or basic design concept changes. Based on Douglas'
experience, however, areas where future effort could be directed productively
are suggested. /
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DISCUSSION
J.H. Gerstle, Boeing
You showed the figure of eight million dollars a year as a fuel cost
penality to carry the added containment weight on a quad-jet. Could you
amplify on the assumptions that went into that figure?
M.A. O'Connor, Jr., McD-D
Basically, there were 971 aircraft in the estimate (635, 3 engine and
336, 4 engine wide bodied transports). We assumed a representative flight
profile (based on an airline cross section) for the fleet and then merely
calculated the fuel consumed to carry the armor weight. The total armor
weights shown represent an upper bound (i.e., armor weights were not dis-
counted for inherent and/or intentional containment capability of the engine
cases. Each stage was assumed equally critical and armor weights were calcu- _
"m
lated and included for full protection).
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